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External Military Intervention in Lesotho’s Recent  
Political Crisis
Mpho G. M o lom o*
Lesotho has in the past few  years been fa ced  with political uncertainty manifesting 
political turmoil and tension. As a result, Botswana and South Africa intervened 
militarily to restore law and order on September 22 1998. The discussion o f  this 
intervention is anchored in two competing paradigms, the need to resolve conflict by 
peaceful means or by the use o f  military force. The intervention generated a lot o f  
controversy regarding its legitimacy and moral righteousness. Two views emerged. 
First, that the intervention was unlawful and amounted to an act o f  aggression on the 
sovereignty o f the Lesotho state and the king. Second, that the intervention saved the 
government from total collapse. O f material concern in this discussion was that the 
intervention raised questions o f  the international legality o f  such action, the credibility 
and consistency o f  Botswana's foreign policy, the effectiveness o f  the Botswana 
Defence Force (BDF) and the appropriate role fo r  SADC in conflict management. It 
nas become evident that despite it being form alised by a treaty, the actions o f  
individual member states are still motivated by national strategic and economic 
interests. This paper concludes that whatever the justification o f  military intervention 
countries in the region should always strive to resolve conflicts peacefully. It further  
points out that SADC member states should form ulate common regional strategies o f  
resolving conflicts in a peaceful manner.
Introduction
It is such a great irony that Lesotho, one of the most ethnically homogeneous 
nations in Southern Africa experienced political turmoil and civil strife of the 
magnitude it had. To be sure, the political and civil strife that manifests itself 
in Lesotho's political process was a culmination of deep-seated tension that has 
been brewing since independence in 1966. The intervention of the Botswana
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Defence Force (BD F) and the South Africa New Defence Force (SA N D F) on 
the 22 September 1998, dubbed operation Boleas, was a result of the 
historical/political forces in that country. At the time of the intervention, the 
Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD ) government had lost control and the 
country was engulfed in mayhem, violence and arson leading to the total 
destruction of Maseru business district and other major urban centres. The 
intervention generated both optimism and frustration on the part of Basotho. It 
engendered optimism from those who saw it as an attempt to restore law and 
order, and frustration from those who viewed it as an invasion of Lesotho.
This paper broadly discusses Botswana/South Africa intervention in Lesotho 
paying particular attention to the part played by Botswana. Taking on board the 
above concerns, this paper is laid out in four broad areas. First, it provides the 
historical context within which to understand the political crisis in Lesotho, 
especially since 1994. Second, it projects scenarios on the legitimacy of the 
intervention. Third, it addresses the implications of the intervention on 
Botswana's foreign policy in Southern Africa. And last, but not lest, it 
concludes that a peaceful settlement was probably not fully explored in the 
resolution of the Lesotho crisis. The paper proceeds to discuss these issues, first 
by setting the contextual framework of understanding the Lesotho crisis.
Contextual Framework
The state in Lesotho has been at the centre of political uncertainty since the pre­
independence elections in 1965. In those elections the Basotho National Party 
(BN P ) which was more of a conservative traditional party won 31 of the 60 
seats in the National Assembly. The Basotholand Congress Party (BC P) came 
a good second with 25 seats while the remaining 4 seats went to the 
Marematlou Freedom Party (M FP) (Southall, 1994: 110). However, the 
political fortunes changed during the 27 January 1970 elections. The BNP, 
having alienated a lot of its rural support base and also having antagonised the 
monarchy by eroding its constitutional prerogatives, it became clear that it was 
not going to win the elections.1 Arguing that the elections marred by violence, 
Leabua Jonathan declared a state of emergency and suspended the constitution 
and thereby instituted authoritarian rule in Lesotho. Henceforth, Lesotho did
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not enjoy free political activity. Political activity was circumscribed, and after 
an attempted coup in 1974, opposition leaders, including Ntsu Mokhehle and 
their supporters went into exile in Botswana. The next elections were not held 
until 1985 but were nothing other than a fa£ade of democracy. In those 
elections the BNP, returned all the 65 parliamentary candidates, also in part due 
to an opposition boycott of poll. Following those elections, the military took 
over power in January 1986. In a fashion typical of military take-overs, Major 
General Justin Lekhanya justified the intervention by arguing that the BNP 
government had not only lost direction but was also facing a legitimacy crisis. 
Political power was however not to return to civilian rule until 1993.
The military orchestrated a return to civilian rule and the first free elections 
since pre-independence elections in 1965 were held on 27 March 1993. In those 
elections, Basotho Congress Party (BC P) swept all the 65 parliamentary seats. 
At face value, the fact that the BCP swept all the seats suggested that it was an 
extremely popular political party. Yet, the political instability that rocked 
Lesotho since 1994 could be traced to its claim to political popularity. As 
indicated in Table 1 below, in 1993 the BCP swept all the parliamentary seats 
with 74.85 percent of the popular vote. The BNP with 22.59 percent of the 
popular vote was not rewarded with a single seat and the M FP with only 1.44 
percent of the popular vote also came out of those elections empty-handed. The 
1998 election results were equally dramatic. The LCD with 60 percent of the 
popular vote won 79 of the 80 seats in the National Assembly leaving only 1 
seat to the opposition that had collectively polled 40 percent of the popular 
vote. This underscores the need for a broad based electoral system.
Table I: Party Electoral Performance in 1993 and 1998
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Contestants No. o f votes % of votes No. of seats
BCP 398 355 74.7 65
BNP 120 686 22.6 0
M FP 7 650 1.4 0
Other 6 287 1.2 0
Total 532 978 100 65
Party Electoral Performance in 1998
Contestants No. of votes % of votes No. of seats
LCD 355 049 60.7 79
BNP 143 073 24.5 1
BCP 61 793 10.6 0
MFP 7 460 1.3 0
Other 16 244 2.9 0
Total 584 740 100 80
Source: Roger Southall, The 1993 Election', Review of African
Political Economy Vol. 21 No. 59 (1994) pp. 110-118; Roger 
Southall, 'Democracy at Gunpoint? South Africa Intervenes1, 
Southern Africa Report, Vol. 14.1 (1998) pp. 12-17; 
Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), Provisional Results, 
May 27, 1998.
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In both the 1993 and 1998 elections, the opposition, stunned at being trounced 
even in areas known to be their traditional strongholds cried foul. Both these 
elections were observed by national and international groups. While noting 
some administrative hiccups in their conduct, observers declared the elections 
'free and fair'. Attempts by the BNP, in the case of the 1993 election to nullify 
the results through the courts were defeated. Disaffection with the 1998 election 
was manifested by the disturbances that led to the SADC intervention.
This paper is informed by the assertion that while elections are considered to 
be the hallmark of democracy and an important instrument through which 
leaders are elected into public office, they nevertheless must enjoy legitimacy 
and credibility of the broad cross section of the electorate (Molomo, 1997: 
151). The biggest problem in Lesotho, was not so much that there were 
irregularities and electoral fraud, but that the results did not conform to the 
expectations of the political players. The lack of consonance between the 
expectations of the contestants and outcomes of the elections led to the 
perception that they were rigged. Upon the realisation that the opposition 
parties did not accept the election resulted and were already working to 
undermine the LCD government, SADC appointed a commission of inquiry to 
investigate the conduct of the elections. While the findings of the Langa 
Commission Report (1998) were not conclusive, they did point to some 
irregularities in the conduct of the elections. The report cited incidents of 
broken seals of containers that were supposed to be intact. These included 
opened containers with ballot papers, used ballot books and counterfoils that 
according to the law could only be opened through the instructions of a court 
order. However, in spite of the evidence the integrity of the documents was 
compromised by the Independent Electoral Commission's ( IE C ’s) failure to 
comply with the regulations the Langa Commission was unable to nullify the 
election results.
The concerns of electoral fraud and irregularities notwithstanding, it appears the 
root cause of the crisis, in part, had to do with the electoral system. Lesotho 
operates the Westminster parliamentary system, sometimes referred to as the 
'winner-take-air electoral system. In the same manner as in Botswana, this 
system produces predominant party systems (Mokopakgosi and Molomo,
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1999). Under the 'winner-take-all' system, parliamentary representation is not 
arrived at on the basis of the popular vote. Worst still, a candidate who polls a 
sizeable proportion of the vote but fails to emerge as the overall winner does 
not gain representation to the National Assembly. This was attested by the fact 
that during the May 23, 1998 elections in Lesotho the opposition that polled 40 
percent of the popular vote only emerged with 1 seat in parliament of 80 seats. 
The outcomes of these elections manifested the most cogent example of how 
unrepresentative the 'winner take all' situation can be. However, this system 
unlike Proportional Representation (PR) does not reward minor parties as well 
as sectional interests. While it makes a good case for strong cabinets, stable and 
responsive governments; through it, the implications for consensus decision­
making are lost. At this juncture, the debate of which of the two systems is best 
is better left for Basotho but what is apparent is that the 'winner-take-all' system 
has exposed its limitations, at least for Lesotho's political situation.
The role of the monarchy cannot be discounted in the power struggles in 
Lesotho. Lesotho is a constitutional monarchy in which the King is only a 
ceremonial Head of State without executive powers. Nevertheless, the King still 
enjoys support from Basotho as the father of the nation since the pre­
independence elections. Marematlou Freedom Party (M FP) has been 
campaigning for the executive authority of the King (Southall, 1994: 110). 
Over the years, the monarchy has tried to assert its influence without much 
success. Its efforts only met limited success after the military, led by Major- 
General Justin Lakhanya, took over the reigns of power and temporarily vested 
executive and legislative authority in the King. In the continuing jostle for 
political power, Lekhanya forced the King - Moshoeshoe II - to leave the 
country in 1990 and dethroned him in favour of his son, Letsie III. Regarding 
the 1998 crisis, the King thought the general source of lawlessness would 'melt 
down' the multi-party electoral system and in the process the monarchy would 
assert its authority (South African Communist Party, 1998: 7).
The military in Lesotho, having successfully intervened in politics, cannot be 
said to be firmly under civilian control. It is commonplace that the military 
along with the police as the coercive arm of the state are charged with the 
responsibility of maintaining law and order. The role of the military is to uphold
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the rule of the hegemonic alliance. To the extent that the hegemonic fraction of 
the ruling class is legitimate in the eyes of the populace, governance will 
proceed without the use of force. The role of the military has to be understood 
within the context of peace and security. The question of national security is a 
vexed, multi-faceted and sometimes polemical issue. For purposes of this paper,
I will adopt the definition of Black (1998: 2) who takes a broader view of 
security that transcends its narrow definition to mean 'defending the sovereignty 
and the territoriality of the state'. Anglin (1998: 13) was comprehensive in his 
conceptualisation of security policy that it needs:
to encompass the consolidation of democracy, the achievement of 
social justice, economic development and a safe environment, and a 
substantial reduction in the level of crime, violence and socio­
economic problems like poverty, unemployment, poor education, the 
lack of housing and the absence of adequate social services.
In Lesotho, the interface between government and the military has been a 
curious one. The BNP regime in an attempt to consolidate its hold on power, 
bolstered image and stature of the Basotho National Party's Youth League at the 
expense of the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF), an action which virtually turned 
the Youth League into para-military force. The creation of parallel structures 
in the national security system led to a loss of morale by the LDF and Lesotho 
experienced its first military take-over in 1986 led by Lekhanya. Later on, 
junior officers overthrew Lekhanya on 30 April 1991, and Colonel Elias 
Ramaema became the new military leader. It was not until 1993 that there was 
a return to civilian rule under a popularly elected government of Basutoland 
Congress Party (BCP). In spite of this take over, the BNP in its 27 years of rule 
had entrenched itself especially in the military such that successive 
governments were bound to encounter legitimacy crises.
Without any institutional backing from the loyal coercive apparatus, the police 
and military, the BCP government hang on a delicate balance. In an attempt to 
regain the political authority it lost, the monarchy instituted a constitutional 
coup in August 1994. King Letsie was able to make this move because of the 
tacit support of the military, an active encouragement of the opposition BNP
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and royalist forces' (Weisfelder, 1997: 35). In part, the intention of the 'reluctant 
king' was to reinstate his father to the throne. As Weisfelder (1997) attests, the 
mediation by the SADC troika (Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe) and 
combination and domestic pressurre by organs of civil society not only restored 
to power the elected BCP government, but also led to the reinstatement of King 
Moshoeshoe II and facilitated a national dialogue and reconciliation that 
included all political parties and other interested actors. However, the untimely 
death of King Moshoeshoe II in a car accident in January 1996 did not help the 
fragile political situation in Lesotho.
To further exacerbate problems, the BCP was torn apart by factional fights. It 
would appear that these factional fights were not based on ideological 
differences, but rather on the lack of internal democracy within the party 
structures. In the wake of an ailing leader, Ntsu Mokhehle, and the lack of 
clearly defined lines of political succession, struggles by factions contending 
for hegemony ensued. The unstable political situation was further precipitated 
by labour unrest that resulted in government making several concessions and 
trade-offs w ith several segments of the workforce.
Due to internal divisions within the ruling BCP government, unable to restore 
peace within the estranged party, Mokhehle resigned from the BCP to form 
Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD). Nevertheless, Mokhehle was able to 
continue as Prime Minister because the majority of the BCP members of 
Parliament crossed the floor to join the LCD. The BCP that was popularly 
elected in the 1993 election was forced into the opposition in the middle of its 
term in office by virtue of the LCD's parliamentary majority. The BCP 
contested the parliamentary coup through the courts but were assured that the 
formation of the LCD was legitimate. However, the LCD was confronted by 
a severe legitimacy crisis..
The test for the political legitimacy of the LCD came through the general 
elections of May 23, 1998. Contrary to expectations that it would lose the 
elections, the LCD shocked many by being returned to power by an 
overwhelming of majority 79 of the 80 seats in parliament. The landslide 
victory that it recorded seemed to suggest that the government of Pakalitha
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Mosisili would not have a legitimacy problem. However, that assumption was 
misplaced. Having failed to unseat government through the ballot box, 
opposition parties resorted to unconstitutional means. Etefore long the LCD 
government had to grapple with the worst political crisis in Lesotho. Youths 
armed with AK  47 assault rifles, allegedly supplied by the military, caused 
havoc in Maseru and other urban areas, terrorised people, high-jacked their 
vehicles, mounted illegal road blocks and went on a wild rampage of looting 
and lawlessness. It would appear all this was happening with the tacit approval 
of not only the opposition, but also the security establishment.
As positions hardened between the government and the opposition over 
contestation for state power, SADC intervened to restore peace, law and order. 
By way of resolving the impasse, SADC appointed Justice Pius Langa to head 
a commission on the conduct of the May 23, 1998 elections. As investigations 
proceeded, supporters of opposition parties staged a sit-in outside the royal 
palace 'calling on the King to dissolve parliament and form a government of 
national unity'. In an attempt to defuse the situation, the King was asked to 
address the nation and 'call on the crowd camped at the palace to disperse'. In 
a strange set of circumstances, which may be taken to amount to complicity, the 
King, as he read his speech forgot that part where he was supposed to call on 
the crowd to disperse from the royal grounds'. 'Instead, he asked for more 
powers to deal with the situation' (Mmegi, 1998: 5).
The political situation in Lesotho deteriorated from bad to worse, the rule of 
law was reduced to the bare minimum and anarchy set in. As it were, the 
handling of the Langa report was the last straw on the camel's back. Media 
reports hold the view that after its initial discussion by the troika, those sections 
that questioned the legitimacy of the LCD government were re-written (Boot, 
1998: 6). When the report was finally handed down to Basotho, it was received 
with mixed feelings questioning its authenticity. At this stage, the ground was 
already set for a mutiny within the LDF. Convinced that there was a cover-up 
on the part of SADC, demonstrators began to intimidate people and stopped 
them from going to work as well as to stone and highjack government vehicles. 
In the wake of mounting civil unrest, the police and military instead of 
maintaining law and order joined the fray. The mutinous junior army officers
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caused havoc, they arrested 50 of their seniors and forced 28 of them, including 
the army chief, to retire and as well demanded huge salary increases (AFP, 
1998: 1). Bereft of any hope of controlling the situation, Prime Minister 
Pakalitha Mosisili requested SADC states to intervene and restore law and 
order in Lesotho.
Legitimacy of Intervention
The Botswana/South Africa intervention in Lesotho raised considerable debate 
regarding its legitimacy and moral righteousness. Basotho were divided on the 
issue. Two dominant positions emerged. First, some observers were opposed 
to the intervention. They viewed it as an act of aggression against their 
sovereign state and the King, and dubbed it as an outright invasion more so that 
it was done without the consent of the King. However, another view suggests 
that the Prime Minister was legally empowered to call for foreign intervention, 
and was not obliged to consult the King. Second, other observers hailed the 
intervention as having saved their government from total collapse. Those in 
favour of the intervention, taking full cognisance of the extent of anarchy and 
lawlessness, wondered what would have happened had foreign forces not 
intervened in Lesotho?
Inevitably, therefore, the intervention provoked mixed reactions, optimism and 
hope for those who were in favour of it, and anger and frustration from those 
who were opposed to it. Be that as it may, even though a lasting political 
settlement has not yet been found, questions have been raised about the 
necessity of the intervention. It has raised question of the international legality 
of such action, the credibility and consistency of [Botswana’s] foreign policy, 
the effectiveness of the [BDF] and the appropriate role for SADC (Southall, 
1998: 12).
The question of paramount importance whether or not this military intervention 
was legitimate? This begs a further question, legitimate for whom, the 
government or the people of Lesotho? It appears necessary to make a distinction 
between the government and the people because the legitimacy of the 
government was also in question. Perhaps more importantly, one must first of
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all address the principle ol the intervention. More broadly, the question is, if 
there was an abrogation ol democracy in any Southern Africa country, would 
the SADC forces intervene? At a rather hypothetical level, if the government 
of South Africa was faced with a similar problem to that of Lesotho, would 
SADC, if requested, be in a position to intervene? My guess is no. In the case 
of Lesotho, one is hard pressed to dispel the thinking that it was the case of the 
strong prevailing over the weak! Assuming that the view that Lesotho was 
invaded holds, then Article 4 (a) of the SADC Treaty which underwrites the 
principle of sovereign equality of all member states was violated. Nevertheless, 
regardless of the motives of the intervention, one is bound to be concerned with 
the whole issue of the sustainability. It hardly needs emphasis that SADC does 
not have the capacity to sustain regional peace and security. In an attempt to 
enhance their capacity to carry out international operations, SADC member 
states need to embark on more joint operations to establish a common ground 
in military intervention operations as well as similar methods of addressing 
political problems in the region.2
Through the Memorandum of understanding signed in Septemberl 994, the 
troika came to be referred as the guarantors of democracy in Lesotho.3 More 
specifically, the memorandum committed the troika to 'take all necessary 
measures' to restore democracy to Lesotho. As noted by Weisfelder (1997: 41), 
the troika moved in positively to end the 'isolation' of the Lesotho Defence 
Force (LDF) from regional groupings. It encouraged it to participate in regional 
meetings of the SADC inter-state Defence and security Committee and in local 
interactions with South African commanders to combat drug smuggling, illegal 
immigration and cattle rustling along the border. Further steps were taken to 
ensure the political neutrality of the security forces.
I he intervention in Lesotho needs to be placed in the right regional context. 
Lesotho finds itself in an unenviable geo-political situation of being totally 
surrounded and economically dependent on South Africa. In order to assert its 
independence and sovereignty, it has to find the right balance to co-exist with 
its powerful neighbour on mutually beneficial terms. The maintenance of that 
balance has not been easy for the mountainous kingdom. Lesotho, during the 
era of the 'Total Strategy'4 was a victim of South Africa's destabilisation
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campaign, and naturally the 1998 intervention, more so that it resulted in loss 
of life, opened old wounds. That South Africa's economic blockade of Lesotho 
was a catalyst to the 1986 military take-over was not in doubt, but it could not 
be argued conclusively that it had a hand in the coup. However, as pointed out 
by Matlosa (1991: 5), there is ample evidence that after the coup South Africa 
'pressed home its advantage' and 'developed a harmonious relationship' with the 
military government.
The assertion by Swatuk and Black (1997: 139) that wars of the next 
millennium would be fought over scarce resources such as water was given 
more credence by the Lesotho intervention. The Katse Dam of the Lesotho 
Highlands Water Scheme, constructed with the assistance of South African 
capital is one of the largest man made dams in the Southern Hemisphere and 
supplies South Africa with water. It appears reasonable to assume that apart 
from its obligations as member of troika, South Africa had sufficient motive to 
intervene in Lesotho. Well, in a remote sense, it could be argued that South 
Africa intervened in Lesotho to contain the political unrest in that country from 
spilling over into its territory. Furthermore, South Africa may have feared to be 
inundated with political refugees from Lesotho if that country fell to military 
rule.
It was expected that South Africa during the post-apartheid period would 
emerge as a 'benevolent regional hegemon' (McGowan, and Ahwireng - Obeng, 
1998). With the military intervention in Lesotho, questions were being asked 
whether the region, with South Africa taking the lead, was sliding back into the 
era of destabilisation? The moot question was why did South Africa under the 
auspices of SADC intervene in Lesotho and not say in Angola? Needless to 
add, the Angolan government never requested SADC for assistance, but it is 
ironic that its member states never found it appropriate to intervene militarily 
in that country, especially since the 1992 elections whose results were rejected 
by UN ITA . Nevertheless, it was pertinent to point out that since the UN 
brokered peace accord in Lusaka in 1994, peace or failure to secure peace in 
Angola has been a matter for international concern.
The reasons for Botswana's military intervention in Lesotho were not so
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apparent. The commander of the BDF, Lieutenant-General Matshwenyego 
Louis Fisher (1996: 2), outlined that, among others, Botswana's national 
interests include national survival, sovereignty, territorial integrity, military and 
economic security, self reliance and social justice. Therefore, based on the 
above assertion and also its geo-political situation in relation to Lesotho, it is 
hard to imagine that Botswana intervened in Lesotho on account of national 
security considerations. But it is pertinent to ask, what would Botswana's 
stability mean in a volatile region? At best, a spokesperson of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs said, apart from its responsibility as part of the troika to 
guarantee democracy in Lesotho, Botswana intervened in Lesotho in good faith 
-to help a sister country that was in turmoil. It is without doubt that Batswana 
have a natural affinity to Basotho and would want to help them at a time of 
need. However, cynics argue that Botswana's intervention only served to 
legitimise what would otherwise have been dubbed a South African invasion 
of Lesotho, to pass as a SADC intervention (Botswana Guardian, 1998: 8). We 
shall return to this point when we discuss South Africa's intervention in 
Lesotho.
International peace keeping operations that Botswana participated in, like the 
ones in Somalia and Mozambique, were greeted with favour by Batswana, but 
the Lesotho intervention was viewed with mixed feelings. The Lesotho 
intervention was different in many respects. First, it was different because it 
involved an element of surprise and all the stakeholders were not consulted 
prior to its execution. Second, it was not accorded a peacekeeping status as the 
other ones that the BD F participated in under the auspices of the United 
Nations referred to above. Third, unlike in other operations, Botswana 
intervened in Lesotho without having signed the Status of Forces Agreement 
(SOFA), that is, the rules regulating the conduct of forces in a foreign country. 
And finally, much as it was called a SADC operation, Botswana has to pay the 
entire bill of its operation in Lesotho. In a strange set of circumstances, in that 
the operation is dubbed a SADC operation, the Lesotho government had to pay 
for all the expenses incurred by the SANDF in the operation. The intervention 
in the DRC also projects another scenario.
When civil war broke out in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the
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Tutsi led rebels with the assistance of Uganda and Rwanda, both Botswana and 
South Africa opted for a peaceful settlement through negotiations. Yet, the two 
SADC states found it appropriate to intervene militarily in Lesotho. To further 
conflate the situation, the intervention in Lesotho was done at the request of the 
head of government without the knowledge of the head of state - the King. 
Zimbabwe, as part of the troika, was invited to intervene in Lesotho but 
declined because it was already involved in the DRC. However, Zimbabwe 
feeling vindicated from its militaristic forages in the Congo it gave other 
members of the troika a nod to intervene. The Congo with its vast mineral and 
water resources has great promise for the region in the next millennium. 
Respecting the intervention in the DRC, the strategic and economic gains for 
Zimbabwe5 are apparent. The economic potential of the Congo for Southern 
Africa in terms of investment and trade links are obvious, but unfortunate!) 
they can only be tapped by making sure that it does not fall into rebel hands.
To be sure, the SADC intervention in Lesotho was markedly different from that 
in the DRC. In Lesotho, notwithstanding charges of irregularities and electoral 
fraud, SADC intervened to support a popularly elected government. The same 
analogy, however, cannot be made of the DRC because President Laurant 
Kabila came to power as a result of force in opposition to Mobutu's kleptocracy 
and authoritarian rule. In effect the intervention in the Congo was to support an 
undemocratic government. In the final analysis, the foreign intervention in the 
DRC seems to have provided Kabila with the impetus to refuse to negotiate 
w'ith the Tutsi-led rebels that are trying to remove him from power (Fabricius, 
1998: 12). With the war in the Congo and the intervention in Lesotho at least 
six SADC countries were at war, a worrying situation indeed.
Out of this concern, two schools of thought emerged regarding the SADC 
military intervention in Lesotho. The first view maintained that, whatever the 
justification, peaceful negotiation should take precedence over military 
intervention? The second was that a military intervention was justified. Let us 
begin with the first argument. The undeniable truth is that a peaceful settlement 
was the preferred solution to the Lesotho crisis, and that no amount of force can 
produce a lasting political solution. Equally disturbing was the loss of life and 
destruction of property in Lesotho. The military intervention in Lesotho was
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condemned by both political*’ and civil society7 organisations. To this effect, a 
statement by the Secretariat of the South African Communist Party (SA CP) 
(1998:1 1) was incisive to the understanding of the situation. It said:
The opposition parties clearly had a case when calling into doubt the fairness 
of the May elections. But the opposition parties, and King Letsie were 
prepared to play a highly reckless game in pursuit of their various objectives.
The call for fresh elections, or at the very least by-elections in many 
constituencies, was absolutely legitimate, as was mass Mobilisation around 
such demands. But fostering of a creeping coup, the use of junior ranks of the 
LD F (historically a problematically partisan army with allegiances to the BNP) 
to undermine the unity of the army, and to terrorise the police, went way 
beyond the legitimate.
To say that the army went beyond the legitimate does not ipso facto justify a 
foreign intervention. It does however, indicate that the opposition and law 
enforcement institutions were speculating on the breakdown of law and order. 
Basotho need to be reminded that for democracy to work both ruling and 
opposition have a constructive role to play in society. Ruling parties are given 
the mandate to govern in consultation with the various interests in society. For 
its part, as observed in the statement of the SACP (1998: I I ) ,  the LCD 
government despite the fact that it had lost control of government remained 
defiant and 'extremely arrogant about the elections and about its right to rule'. 
Opposition parties also have a responsibility to project an alternative vision 
within the confines of the law to that of the ruling party. By their very nature 
they seek to capture state power, but this has to be done within the laid out 
parameters. As well argued by Booysen (1998: 31), in the event that they fail 
to win elections, they are expected to remain loyal opposition parties and 
participate in the affairs of the state in an attempt to 'modify the policies and 
actions of government (or lack of action). Yet, in the case of Lesotho, the 
opposition worked to undermine government and even led to the collapse of 
law and order.
The second view was one that favoured a military intervention. The arguments 
in favour of a military intervention were that the extent of lawlessness in 
Lesotho was beyond reproach and could only be redeemed by force (Tsie, 
1998: 12). Needless to add, before the intervention Lesotho was already under
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siege from youths masquerading as the armed vigilantes. So, to blame the 
violence and arson that took place in Lesotho on the intervening forces as some 
Basotho maintain is not totally correct. Besides, the fight that the LDF put 
against the SADC force, especially at Makhonyane barracks was prove of their 
tenacious determination to hold their ground. The destruction of Maseru 
reflected deep-seated frustration among Basotho not only towards a foreign 
intervention, but also to the high levels of unemployment. Faced with a 
shrinking job market in the South African mines as preference was given to 
South African citizens, Lesotho has to deal with serious economic hardships 
(Weisfelder, 1997: 38). So under the circumstances, the argument goes, only 
a military intervention could restore law and order in Lesotho. As it turned out, 
weighing its options the SADC troika decided to intervene militarily.
Briefing members of the diplomatic community, Botswana's Foreign Affairs 
Minister, Lieutenant General Mompati Meratlie (1998) said Botswana's primary 
objective in its intervention in Lesotho was to restore public order and normalcy 
in that country. He further pointed out that a military take-over had been in the 
offing in the kingdom. In its mandate as a SADC force, he concluded, the 
Botswana Defence Force (BD F ) will remain in Lesotho until a long-term 
political solution was found.8 Meratlie justified the intervention that it was not 
only in accordance with Article 5 (c) of the SADC Treaty and Article 51 of the 
United Nations Charter, but also the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 
resolution of the Harare Summit of 1997 that condemns the overthrow of 
legitimate governments by the military.9 In what Good (1997) would term 
accountable to themselves Minister Merafhe did not take kindly to probing by 
opposition Members of Parliament on whether or not government had consulted 
fully before intervening militarily in Lesotho.10
Returning to South Africa's intervention in Lesotho, their position was 
explained by Mangosuthu Buthelezi (1998:9), who at the time was acting 
President in the absence of Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki, that it was 
meant to neutralise a brewing military coup in Lesotho." According to van 
Nieuwkerk (1998: 3), Buthelezi maintained that the coup would have prevented 
the majority party, the opposition and the monarchy from performing their 
respective constitutional roles and would have been an equal threat to them all.
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For his part, foreign minister Afred Nzo is reported to have said, the South 
African government would not stand by and watch groups in Lesotho refuse to 
explore all peaceful means of dispute and allow that country to slide into 
lawlessness. For South Africa, it would appear the whole talk of African 
renaissance1 would be hollow it the people in the region were engulfed in 
conflict.
Quite to the contrary, a dominant view in Lesotho was that the military 
intervention of Botswana and South Africa was to prop up the LCD 
government widely regarded as illegitimate because it supposedly came to 
power by rigging the May 23 1998 elections. However, at variance with the 
speculation that the intervening forces would be partial in favour of the LCD, 
it turned out that they intervened to lay a stable foundation for an even-handed 
settlement of the dispute over election results. The SADC mediation also 
recommended the formation of an Interim Political Authority ( IP A )13 that would 
facilitate the holding of a fresh election within 15 to 18 months. 
Notwithstanding the difficulties that the IPA is facing in carrying out its 
mandate, it appears that Lesotho is moving toward reconciliation as the LCD 
government has unconditionally released some of the alleged perpetrators of 
violence and the foiled coup.
Questions were raised as to whether or not operation Boleas was indeed a 
SADC operation, and this has generated a lot of debate in peoples' minds. First, 
if this was indeed a SADC operation why did the BDF not arrive at the same 
time as the SAN D F? Second, why the SANDF when they arrived in Lesotho 
already signed an agreement defining the Status of Forces Agreement? Third, 
if the operation was conducted under the auspices of Article 5 (c) of the SADC 
Treaty, why is SADC not footing the bill? The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
the SADC Secretariat maintain that SADC had not yet ratified the protocol 
establishing the SADC Organ on Politics Defence and Security. By the same 
token, then, how can it be a SADC operation?
The manner in which operation Boleas was orchestrated raised scepticism not 
only about it being a SADC operation, but also about it being a peacekeeping 
mission. On a positive note, at least for Botswana, Basotho perceive BDF
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intervention as having been done in good faith. Thanks to its experience in 
international peacekeeping missions in Somalia and Mozambique, Botswana 
entered Lesotho in full view flying a white flag up front and a Botswana flag 
at the back. However, media reports in South Africa responding to the loss of 
live by the SANDF, without full knowledge of how the operation was planned, 
opined that had the BD F  been swift enough in their intervention, probably 
Maseru would not have been subjected to so much devastation, arson and 
violence. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the BD F  have however refuted 
these allegations. The BDF commander, Fisher was unequivocal in his assertion 
that, 'the late arrival of the BD F in Lesotho was by design'. Me added, 'we had 
strategised with the SANDF that they would move in First and would follow 
later', a view that was confirmed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.14 Asked 
why there was an element of surprise15 in the intervention, the BD F responded 
that it was necessary to minimise the likelihood of casualties on both sides. The 
problem was that the SANDF did not expect to face intense resistance from the 
mutinous LDF, especially at the Makoanyane barracks. The SANDF had to call 
for more reinforcements from troops stationed in Maseru and thereby 
weakening the power of that force to deal with the looters. Fisher's point of 
view was, though indirectly, corroborated by Lieutenant-Colonel Laverne 
Machine (1998:1) who admitted that the operation was misled by 'sloppy 
intelligence and a false sense of military superiority'. Besides, the rules of 
engagement were not clear, it was not clear what to do with the looters. There 
was also no curfew to unable the armv to effectively contain the mutinous 
situation.
In any case, whether or not the intervention was legitimate, it is now water 
under the bridge. Much as the intervention can be treated as a fait accompli, 
there is need to draw lessons from it and chart a way forward. Naturally, issues 
of foreign intervention hinge on a country's foreign policy, and the following 
section focuses on it.
Implications for Botswana's Foreign Policy
Botswana's foreign policy needs to be anchored on its national values of peace 
and democracy. Widely regarded as a peace-loving nation, its relations with
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other countries must reflect that image. Over the years, Botswana has 
maintained a policy of peaceful co-existence and non-interference in the 
internal affairs of other countries. Without doubt, Botswana is a front runner in 
multi-party democracy and as such has been seen as a beacon of democracy in 
the region. Botswana as a member of the United Nations (UN ) has contributed 
to peace and security in Africa by participating, with great distinction, in UN 
peacekeeping operations in Somalia and Mozambique. However, these 
operations were different from the intervention in Lesotho. The inclination of 
Botswana to resolve the Lesotho crisis by military means is a source of grave 
concern because it not only compromised its cherished ideal of non-interference 
in the internal matters of other countries but also its integrity as a peace loving 
nation.
Botswana has during the 1990s, in a quest to build a viable national army, 
committed at least 13 percent of its national budget to defence. As a result, 
countries in the region have been apprehensive about Botswana's military build 
up, especially the building of the Thebephatswa16 Air Base. By way of 
registering their uneasiness to the built up, some neighbouring countries 
opposed its purchase of Leopard Tanks from the Netherlands, which they 
subsequently got from another source. The BDF also acquired F5 fighter- 
bombers from the Americans.
The implications of Botswana's foreign policy and security need to be 
understood within the regional context. The growth of the BDF has generated 
debate within and without the region regarding its possible trajectories. First, 
this growth was viewed favourably by some, especially militarists, who regard 
it as enhancing the country's capacity to effect a solid national defence system. 
In this regard, the military is said to impact positively on national security by 
acting as a deterrent to forces that may seek to destabilise the polity. It has been 
convincingly argued that through regional peace and stability there is a greater 
chance for the state to marshal its resources toward the alleviation of poverty, 
hunger, disease, and the provision of social services. Second, it was viewed 
with suspicion within the country that it would undermine the democratic 
culture that the country has promoted and nurtured since independence. 
Furthermore, it has also been seen as having a destabilising effect as a source
152 External Military Intervention
of insecurity among neighbouring countries as well as an effective instrument 
for suppressing citizens, and a drain on resources that could be used for national 
development. Third, the region had just emerged from South Africa's 
destabilisation during the era of the total strategy was weary of any 
militarisation that could give rise to further uncertainty. This insecurity may 
lead countries in the region into an arms race that would not only divert funds 
from development projects, but may also precipitate war. True to history, these 
fears are not baseless. Botswana's relations with Namibia, though cordial, have 
not been smooth since the territorial claims of both countries over Sedudu17 
Island in the Chobe River.
Botswana's role in a highly volatile region is worth mentioning. It has been in 
the forefront of regional co-operation and integration. It was a member of the 
Frontline States, an organisation whose political objectives closely mirrored the 
economic objectives of the Southern African Development Co-ordinating 
Conference (SADCC). As we approach the new millennium, there is great 
optimism concerning political changes in the region. Since the advent of 
majority rule in South Africa, SADCC has since changed its focus from 
reducing dependence on South Africa to regional integration. The loose 
grouping of Southern African countries was formalised with the signing of the 
Southern African development Community Treaty in 1992. However, the recent 
military interventions by SADC member states in Lesotho and the DRC 
undermined this relative peace in the region. The region is now thrown into 
civil strife as well as outside interventions.
Following the decolonization of the entire Southern African sub-continent, the 
FLS outlived its mandate and was dissolved. In its wake, SADC proposed the 
creation of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security that would co-ordinate 
the regional security and defence matters. To recapitulate on the issues, when 
the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security was initially conceived it was 
supposed to report directly to the SADC Heads of State summit, which is the 
supreme policy body of SADC in terms of the 1992 Treaty. However, the 
SADC council of ministers on 18 January 1996 agreed to recommend to the 
summit that the structure of the Organ should allow more flexibility and timely 
response, at the highest level, to sensitive and potentially explosive situations.
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As a result, the protocol establishing the Organ departed substantially from the 
earlier position and it was made to operate as an autonomous body from SADC.
The parallel structures that exist for SADC and the Organ of Politics, Defence 
and Security have thrown regional initiatives into total confusion. Its 
conceptualisation as an autonomous structure was probably oblivious of the 
historical development of the region. During the liberation struggle in Southern 
Africa, Zimbabwe's role as a key player was undisputed. A related, though not 
a central issue, was the fact that the ZANU (PF) government supported the Pan 
Africanist Congress (PAC ) and not the African National Congress (ANC) So, 
there has always been a latent discord the ANC led government in South Africa 
and the ZANU (PF) government in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, South Africa's 
admission into SADC in 1994 also stole the limelight from Zimbabwe. At least 
when Botswana was still chair, the struggle for hegemony was not obvious, but 
with South Africa sitting on the chair of SADC these manifestations are 
unfolding.
So, given the sensitivities in the region, it was probably unwise to have 
Mandela chair SADC and Mugabe the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. 
This set up has polarised SADC to the extent of even threatening its cohesion. 
The SADC chair, on the one hand, supported by some SADC countries prefers 
the organ to be answerable to the mother body. While the chairman of the 
Organ, on the other hand, argues for its operational autonomy in order to 
perform its 'unique and specific mandate'. The impasse that SADC faced on the 
intervention in the DRC underscores the importance of a resolution to this 
issue. Otherwise SADC will operate like an ad-hoc body bereft of any clear 
direction.
Finally, in absence of debate in the National Assembly or dialogue with organs 
of civil society and the academic community, the bureaucracy remains the sole 
agent in defining the form and content of Botswana's foreign policy. Over the 
years foreign policy making has been a preserve of the Office of President and 
the Ministry of foreign Affairs. FJowever, there have been some recent 
overtures to open up the foreign policy making process but this has not yet been 
visible on the ground. That being the case, the influence of the military in the
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formulation of Botswana's foreign policy has been brought into sharp focus by 
the participation of former army chiefs in the top echelons of government. Two 
examples lend themselves vivid examples. These are the appointments of 
Lieutenant-General Ian Khama Seretse Khama, the Vice President and the 
Minister of Presidential Affairs and Public Administration and Lieutenant- 
General Mompati Merafhe, Botswana's Foreign Minister.
Conclusion
The Botswana/South Africa intervention in Lesotho has important lessons for 
the region. It has demonstrated that for democracy to function it needs to be 
anchored on clear definitions of political responsibility. The people need to 
fully understand the import of the law in general and electoral law in particular. 
It comes out clear in the foregoing analysis that the political crisis in Lesotho 
was precipitated by, among other things, the failure of the electoral system. 
Much as the Independent Electoral Commission has been wanting in its 
conduct of election, the biggest Haw, it appears to me, lies in the electoral 
system. The election outcomes of both the 1993 and 1998 general elections, as 
illustrated in table 1, demonstrate that 'the-winner- take- all' electoral system 
falls far too short of satisfying the political expectations of Basotho. It would 
appear that some brand of the PR system would come closer to resolving the 
problem.
Much as SADC can be blamed for its poor co-ordination of operation Boleas, 
Basotho also share the blame for burning down Maseru. Basotho need to know 
that there are well-defined structures for redress, but violence is not one of 
them. Through the intervention, SADC not only exposed its lack of capacity to 
carry out regional peace keeping missions, but also the lack of coherent policy 
regarding the role of SADC and the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. 
The operation reflected the inadequacy of intelligence information that about 
the movement and positions of the rebel forces. What SADC needs to do is to 
re-focus and develop a strategic vision that would solve conflicts in a peaceful 
manner. Peace keeping operations in SADC need not only involve governments 
but needs also to involve organs of civil society. This analysis recognizes that 
while SADC in a Community of the basis of the treaty it signed in 1992, the
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individual member states are different in their ideological and political 
outlooks. A more pressing need is to ground SADC with the grassroots to forge 
a closer identification with the people.
By way of conclusion, it needs to be stated that no amount of foreign 
intervention can win peace in Lesotho. This begs the question of how long the 
SADC forces would remain in Lesotho to restore law and order? And what 
guarantee do we have that after their departure order will prevail in that 
country? The onus is on Basotho to bury the hatchet and open a new' leaf of 
national reconciliation toward sustainable democracy. Furthermore, attempts 
to restructure and depoliticize the LDF must proceeded cautiously in the overall 
context of a political settlement.
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Notes
i
2
3 .
4
A subsequent analysis of the election results reflected that the BCP had polled 49.8% of 
the popular vote translating to 36 seats while the BN P had 42.2% of the popular vote but 
only 23 seats, and M FP 7.3% of the popular vote resulting in 1 seat.
SADC member states had one such operation in Zimbabwe in 1996 and the next one 
termed 'blue crane' is planned for April 7 to 30, 1999 in South Africa. For further detail 
see Mabel Kebotsamang, 'SADC to Embark on Regional Peace Keeping Exercise', 
Botswana Daily News 5 March 1999, p. 1.
This memorandum was entered into by the Presidents of Botswana, South Africa and 
Zimbabwe (often referred to as the SADC troika). His Majesty King Letsie III and the 
then Prime Minister of Lesotho, the late Dr. Ntsu Mokhehle.
The 'Total Strategy' was a policy of the South African State in which it was at was at war 
with its own people as well as its neighbours in the region. At the national level the policy 
sought acquiescence and complicity from the oppressed majority. At the regional level, 
it wanted to cow the neighbouring countries from being vocal against apartheid and act 
as a bulwark against the imposition mandatory economic sanctions. It involved economic 
back-mail and cross -border raids (1982 and 1985) designed to destabilize these countries, 
l or detail see Ben Turok, (ed.  ^ Witness From the Frontline: Aggression and Resistance 
in Southern Africa, London: Institute for African Alternatives, 1990.
Zimbabwe has clear business interests in the Congo. The Zimbabwean Defence industry 
was said to be owed sometime in September 1998 some USS 20 million from the sale of 
arms, mortars, uniforms, dry rations and ammunition. See Mmegi 11-17 September 1998 
p. 21.
Opposition political parties in Lesotho were unequivocal in their condemnation of foreign 
intervention in their country. They said they regarded any intervention from outside as 
aggression against King Letsie III and his kingdom. According to a spokesperson of the 
Basotholand Congress Party, Molapo Qhobela, Lesotho is a sovereign state and not a 
SADC colony. For their part, opposition political parties in Botswana shared similar 
sentiments of their counterparts in Lesotho and condemned the intervention in Lesotho. 
The leader of the Botswana National Front (BN F ), Dr Kenneth Koma said, instead of 
uniting the people of Lesotho the soldiers engage them in war [that] result in the death of 
people. He further charged that, SADC leaders should have sat down, looked at the 
findings of the Langa Commission and acted on the findings which [suggested] 
irregularities in the elections. The United Action Party leader Ephraim Setshwaelo said 
Botswana's military intervention in Lesotho was uncalled for because a peaceful solution 
could have been reached had we not sent our troops. Setshwaelo further remarked, it was 
surprising that the two countries were intervening on behalf of a country accused of 
rigging elections whilst on the other hand they claimed to be protecting democracy. To
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this end. Setshwaelo concluded, if interventions of this nature are not condemned SADC 
will in the end he reduced to a machinery whose overall duty is to maintain dictators and 
despots. For his part, the Executive Secretary of the official opposition, Botswana 
Congress Party (BCP), Raphael Sikwane, wondered why countries that opposed military 
intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo have seen it fit to send troops to 
Lesotho. Joining the chorus, the leader of the United Socialist Party, Nehcmiah Modubule, 
said his party's view of the issue was simply that Lesotho had been invaded by foreign 
troops whom he said should be pulled out as soon as possible to let Basotho solve their 
own problems. The Langa report, Modubule emphasised, had clealy indicated that the 
Lesotho elections were rigged by the ruling party and, as such, they saw no reason why 
the BD F  should be used to protect an illegitimate government. In South Africa too, the 
opposition parties were up in arms calling for a truce and mediation in the Lesotho crisis. 
The leader of the National Party, Marthinus van Schlkwyk, said the joint South 
African/Botswana forces have not brought stability to the region but have instead 
exacerbated the situation. In a similar fashion, other opposition leaders, Tony Leon of the 
Democratic Party and Constant Vil joen of the Freedom Front condemned the deployment 
of foreign troop in Lesotho and called for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of 
foreign troops. For further details see: A Statement of the South African Council of 
Churches, 'Conflicts Should be resolved by Peaceful Means', The Gazette, October 7 
1998, p. 11; Dikarabo Ramadubu, 'BD F in Lesotho,' The Midweek Sun, 23 September 
1998, p. 1; Morula Morula, 'Pull out of Lesotho - Urge Botswana Opposition Parties', The 
Botswana Guardian. 25 September 1998. p. 2: Jovial Rantao, 'Opposition SA Parties Call 
for Truce and Mediation', The Star, 24 September 1998. p. 3.
The South African Council of Churches that charged that the Botswana/South Africa 
intervention in Lesotho neglected the principles of negotiation and non-violence that 
defeated apartheid shared the view for peaceful dialogue. In a more forceful way, the 
SACC  urged Southern African governments to refrain from military involvement from 
neighbouring countries and allow them to solve their internal problems by peaceful means.
AFP, 'Calm return to Lesotho After two Days of Heavy Fighting', Botswana Daily News, 
Sept. 24, 1998, p. 1. Botswana's intervention was enforcing the terms of a memorandum 
of agreement signed by King Letsie III, Lesotho's former Prime Minister, the late Ntsu 
Mokhehle, Botswana's former President, Sir Ketumile Masire and South Africa's Nelson 
Mandela in 1994. For further information see: Benison Makele, 'peacekeeping: What 
SADC Force, By Whom? The Botswana Guardian Sept 25 1998. p. 3.
Mompati Merafhe, 'Brief on the Political Crisis in Lesotho', A Brief to the Diplomatic 
Community, 27 September 1998, p. 10.
A visibly irate Merafhe went on to castigate the opposition BCP MPs as frustrated men. 
and even singling them out by name and said Rre Rantao you are frustrated. Merafhe 
further asserted we consulted and we owe no body an apology.
Buthelezi in justifying his intervention said he consulted with President Mandela and
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Deputy President Thabo Mbeki both of whom supported the intervention. Furthermore, 
he consulted with his cabinet colleges, the Minister of Defence, Joe Modise, the Minister 
of Safety and Security, Sydney Mufamadi, the Deputy Minister of Defence, Ronnie 
kasralis. the Deputy Minister of Foreign affairs. A/i/ Pahad and the Director -General of 
Foreign Affairs, Jackie Sebele. The full text of Buthelezi's statement can be found in the 
Star Tuesday 6 October 1998. p. 9; Kerry Culliman and Jovial Rantao, Cabinet Endorses 
Decision to send Troops', The Star 24 September 1998. p. 3; Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, 
'Implications for South Africa's Foreign Policy Beyond the Lesotho Crisis,' Presentation 
to a Discussion Forum organized by the Cease-fire Campaign and the Southern African 
Human Rights SC O  Network, October 2. 1998, p. 3.
The Deputy President of South Africa talk of the African renaissance which means the 
self belief and the rein vigorat ion of the African continent to claim its rightful place in the 
global economy. See Thabo Mbeki. 'speech Made on behalf of the ANC on the Occasion 
of Adopting the Constitution on 8 May 1996' The Star 10 December 1998, p 20.
The Independent Political Authority (IPA ) is a body that was formed in place of the 
Independent Electoral Commission to facilitate the arrangements for elections within 15 
and 18 months. For all intends anJ purpose, based on its composition, it is an all-party 
electoral commission. It is rumoured that the IPA does not find the necessary cooperation 
from government because it wanted to project itself as an alternative government.
Interview with Mustaq Moorad and Samuel Outlule of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 
16 February 1990 and The Commander of the BDF, Lieutenant-General Matshwenego 
Louis Fisher on 17 February 1999
People would have noticed a combined convoy of the SA N D F and BD F through South 
Africa and they would have alerted the mutinous soldiers in Lesotho.
Thebephatswa is Botswana's Air Base located in the Kweneng District near Molepolole. 
It is said to be one of the largest and sophisticated air bases in Africa. Its construction 
raised a lot of disquiet in the region regarding Botswana's intentions at a time when the 
region seems to be moving toward greater peace and cooperation.
Sedudu is an island along the Chobe River over which Botswana and Namibia have 
territorial claims. Bilateral talks between the two countries to resolve the matter have 
failed as well as the mediation by President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe. At the time of 
writing the case was being heard at the International Court of Justice at the Hague for 
arbitration and both parties have made an undertaking to respect the final verdict.
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